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IN  THIS  PAPER,  I describe Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC, 
policy  of  the  eight months January-August  1970. And  I  present some 
guesses-based  on the FRB-MIT-Penn econometric model-of  real gross 
national product (GNP)  and interest rates in 1971 for alternative future 
FOMC policies. 
A Change  in FOMC  Strategy 
To my mind, it is very simple to state how monetary policy is best de- 
scribed: by reference  to the variable (an index, perhaps) that the monetary 
authority itself uses in defining its policy. What should be used is the con- 
trol variable of the monetary authority or specifically of the FOMC. So I 
begin here by describing  FOMC strategy and, more particularly,  how it was 
changed in January 1970. 
To  all appearances, the committee's strategy remained essentially un- 
changed for more than three years, from September 1966, when the com- 
mittee first began including a bank credit proviso clause in its directive, 
until December  1969.1 The committee, meeting on the  appointed date, 
1. At its September 13, 1966 meeting, the FOMC adopted a  directive with the 
following  second paragraph: 
"To implement  this policy, System  open market  operations  until the next meeting  of 
the Committee  shall be conducted  with a view  to maintaining  firm  but orderly  conditions 
n the money market;  provided,  however,  that operations  shall be modified  in the lighit  of 
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would decide on target values for its money market variables: free reserves, 
member bank borrowings, the federal funds rate, and, on some occasions, 
the rate on three-month Treasury bills. It would then pass these target 
values along to the Manager of the Federal Reserve System's open market 
account. But it would normally tell him to adjust these values if he found 
bank credit, as measured by the so-called bank credit proxy, to be increas- 
ing more or less than had been expected.2 
In fact, however, the manager seems never to have made large adjust- 
ments and only on rare occasion to have made small ones.3 Of course, the 
committee may have been influenced in  its  choice  of  target values by 
changes in bank credit, whether of the remote or recent past, and may have 
even become, with the passage of time, more and more influenced by past 
changes in bank credit. Even though the manager did not make between- 
meeting adjustments  in target values, the committee may have persisted in 
the inclusion of a bank credit proviso clause in order to remind itself of 
the importance of past changes in bank credit, and thus to  ensure that 
the course bank credit had taken would be considered at each meeting. But 
whatever the explanation, for a period of more than three years ending 
December 1969, the committee used money market variables in defining 
near-term  policy. 
In January 1970, however, the committee evidently changed its strategy. 
At its January 15 meeting, it decided to use a longer time horizon. It also 
decided in favor of an effective proviso clause and, what is equally im- 
portant, on adding a second proviso variable, the narrowly defined money 
stock. 
The committee would go on providing the manager with starting target 
values for the money market variables. It would also provide him with 
near-term target values for the adjusted bank credit proxy and the stock of 
money. And the manager, unless constrained by a Treasury financing or 
unusual  liquidity  pressures  or of any apparently  significant  deviations  of bank  credit  from 
current  expectations  [emphasis  supplied]." 
See Fifty-Third  Annual  Report,  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,  Cover- 
ing Operations  for the Year  1966, p. 179.  The proviso  clause is italicized.  The committee 
began using a proviso  clause in May 1966, but it first  appeared  in lasting form in Sep- 
tember. 
2.  For a definition  of the adjusted  bank credit proxy, see Table 1, note b. 
3. See Stephen  H. Axilrod,  "The FOMC Directive  As Structured  in the Late 1960's: 
Theory and Appraisal,"  Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System (Jan. 28, 
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the threat of a financial crisis, would in future be making such between- 
meeting adjustments  in the target values for the money market variables as 
might be required to realize the target value of an index in which adjusted 
bank credit and the narrowly  defined  stock of money were equally weighted.4 
In brief, the committee decided at its January 15 meeting that it would no 
longer use the funds rate, free reserves, and member bank borrowings as its 
intermediate target variables, or in describing its near-term policies, but 
instead would use adjusted bank credit and the narrowly defined stock of 
money. 
FOMC Strategy of January-August 1970 
Although the second paragraphs of the directives adopted at the meet- 
ings of January 15 and February 10 were not radically new, they did differ 
significantly from that of the December 16 directive, in which no mention 
was made of  a committee desire to  see modest or moderate growth in 
money  and bank credit. And,  at its March  10 meeting, the  committee 
adopted a directive with an obviously different second paragraph, which 
stated the intentions clearly: 
To implement  this policy, the Committee  desired  to see moderate  growth in 
money and bank  credit  over the months  ahead.  System  open market  operations 
until the next  meeting  of the Committee  shall  be conducted  with a view to main- 
taining  money  market  conditions  consistent  with that objective.5 
What is most important, this paragraph  contains no mention of the desired 
state of money market conditions, and thus clearly reflects the change in 
strategy of January 1970. 
The second paragraph of the April 7 directive is the same as that of the 
March  10 directive, except for  a  reference to  a  forthcoming Treasury 
4. According  to the policy record  of the January  15 meeting,  "The Committee  con- 
cluded that in the conduct  of open market  operations  increased  stress  should be placed 
on the objective  of achieving  modest growth in the monetary  aggregates,  with about 
equal weight  being given to bank credit and the money stock." See "Record of Policy 
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal Reserve Builletin,  Vol. 56 
(April 1970),  pp. 338-39. The word "increased"  (rather  than, say, "complete")  presum- 
ably indicates that the committee  was not prepared  to tolerate changes of  unlimited 
size in money market  conditions. 
5. "Record  of Policy Actions,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 56 (June 1970),  p. 512. FOMC Policy:  1970 and Beyond  477 
financing. That this reference was included is fortunate indeed (for the 
Treasury, at any rate). Had the manager not bought large quantities of 
bills at the end of April, the Treasury would evidently have sold very few 
of its notes. When the committee met on May 5, it was very much aware 
of what the manager  had done and, more generally, of a mounting nervous- 
ness in financial markets. It gave the manager target values for the mone- 
tary aggregates, but also instructed him to  do  what was necessary "to 
moderate excessive pressures in financial markets, should they develop."6 
And in the event, the manager had to disregard  his aggregate  target values.7 
At  its meeting of May 26, the committee, seeing a very real threat of 
crisis, adopted a directive with the following second paragraph: 
To implement  this policy,  in view of current  market  uncertainties  and liquidity 
strains,  open market  operations  until  the next meeting  of the Committee  shall  be 
conducted  with  a view  to moderating  pressures  on financial  markets,  while,  to the 
extent  compatible  therewith,  maintaining  bank  reserves  and  money  market  condi- 
tions consistent  with the Committee's  longer-run  objectives  of moderate  growth 
in money  and bank  credit.8 
At  its meeting of June 23, the committee adopted a directive with a not 
dissimilar second paragraph. Clearly, then, near-term FOMC policies of 
the months May through July cannot, at least in principle, be adequately 
described  simply by a sequence of target values of monetary aggregates,  nor 
by a sequence of money market variables. 
The instruction "moderate excessive pressures" can be interpreted as 
follows: Keep money market conditions from firming or, more particu- 
larly, keep the average funds rate and, if possible, the average bill rate from 
increasing. Each near-term policy of the months May through July should 
therefore in principle be described by a listing of monetary aggregate  target 
values and initial values for the federal funds and Treasury bill rates. It 
would  appear, however, that  rate constraints were not  binding, except 
through the first part of May, and that as a practical matter aggregate tar- 
get values serve as a reasonable description of the policies of May through 
July. 
On June 23 the Board of Governors announced the suspension of rate 
ceilings for large-denomination  certificates of deposit of 30 to 89 days' ma- 
6. "Record  of Policy  Actions,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin, Vol. 56 (August  1970),  p. 632. 
7.  "Record of Policy Actions," Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 56 (September  1970), 
p. 711. 
8.  Ibid.,  p. 713. 478  John  H. Kareken 
turity.  The intent  was apparently  to deal with the Penn Central  failure. 
Finding  it difficult,  if not impossible,  to issue  commercial  paper,  corpora- 
tions might  be coming  to their  banks;  and  these  banks,  if free  to pay com- 
petitive  rates for 30- to 89-day  money, would then be able to lend. The 
committee,  when  it met on June  23, told the manager  in effect  to ignore 
the adjusted  bank credit proxy. The committee  agreed that, with the 
suspension  of rate  ceilings,  estimates  of future  changes  in bank  credit  would 
be even  less  reliable  than  usual  and  that "more  rapid  growth  in bank  credit 
than contemplated  earlier  would not necessarily  be inconsistent  with [its] 
longer-run  objective,"  since "to the extent  that the Board's  Regulation  Q 
action  resulted  simply  in a shift of credit  flows  from  market  to bank  chan- 
nels, it would  not involve  an increase  in over-all  credit  flows."9 
At its July  21 meeting,  the committee  decided  that  the threat  of financial 
crisis  had lessened  and adopted  a directive  with a second paragraph  not 
unlike  that of April. But the manager  was told essentially  not to worry 
about the adjusted  bank credit  proxy at that meeting,  and again at the 
August 18 meeting.  From July through  September,  the committee  was 
therefore  using  only one intermediate  target  variable-the money  stock.10 
The  Pattern  of Target  Values 
Table 1 gives quarterly  committee  target values  for the money stock, 
adjusted  bank credit  proxy, and an index that gives equal weight  to the 
money stock and adjusted  bank credit,  taken from the published  policy 
record.  As will  be apparent,  open  market  policy  became  more  expansionary 
(in intent, at least) over the first eight months of 1970. The committee 
adopted  higher  target  values  for both aggregates  at its January  and Feb- 
ruary  meetings  and, against  the background  of a still more bearish  eco- 
9. Ibid., p. 718. It is a little difficult,  however, to square this statement with the 
imposition  and maintenance  of effective  ceiling rates. 
10. For late August and thereafter,  this is not a totally accurate  description.  At its 
meeting  of August 18, the committee  "decided  that open market  operations  should be 
directed  at promoting  some easing of conditions  in credit markets,"  as well as "growth 
in the money stock at a rate somewhat greater  than that of the second quarter."  See 
"Record  of Policy Actions,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 56 (November 1970),  p. 820. 
Quite understandably,  it wanted  lower interest  rates, both short- and long-term,  and so 
went  back to using multiple  (but, regrettably,  unweighted)  intermediate  target  variables. FOMC Policy:  1970 and Beyond  479 
Table  1. Target  Values  of Growth  in Monetary  Aggregates  Set by the 
Federal  Open  Market  Committee,  January-August  1970 
Annual rates of change of averages  for last month of quarter  in percent 
First  Second  Third 
Meeting  date and variable  quarter  quarter  quarter 
January  15 
Money stocks  2.0  ...  ... 
Adjusted bank credit proxyb  -1.0 
Indexe  0.5 
February  10 
Money stock  4.5  ...  ... 
Adjusted  bank credit  proxy  0.0  ...  ... 
Index  2.3  ...  ... 
March  10 
Money stock  2.0  3.0  ... 
Adjusted  bank credit  proxy  0.5  5.0 
Index  1.3  4.0 
April  7 
Money  stock  ...  3.0  ... 
Adjusted bank credit proxy  ...  5.5  ... 
Index  ...  4.3 
May 5 
Money  stock  ...  4.0  ... 
Adjusted bank credit proxy  ...  4.0  ... 
Index  ...  4.0  ... 
May 26 
Money  stock  ...  4.0  4.0 
Adjusted  bank credit proxy  .  4.0  7.0 
Index  ...  4.0  5.0 
Money stock 
June  23  ...  ...  5.0 
July 21  ...  ...  5.0 
August 18  ...  ...5.d 
Sources: "Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal Reserve  Bulletin, 
Vol. 56 (April-November 1970). 
a.  Currency plus demand deposits. 
b.  Total member bank deposits plus Eurodollar indebtedness, affiliate-issued  commercial paper indebt- 
edness, and loans sold under repurchase  agreements. 
c.  One-half money stock plus one-half adjusted bank credit proxy. 
d.  At its August 18 meeting, the FOMC also adopted a 5.0 percent target value for money stock for the 
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nomic  outlook,  a higher  value  for the money  stock  target  at its meetings  of 
early  May and June. 
Open market  policy did not, however,  become steadily  more expan- 
sionary.  At its March  meeting,  the committee  adopted  lower  target  values 
for  the  first  quarter  for  the  money  stock  and  the adjusted  bank  credit  proxy. 
In February  both aggregates  increased  less than had been  expected,11  and 
the committee,  at its March  meeting,  was  therefore  faced  with  choosing  in 
effect  still easier  money  market  conditions  or adopting  lower  first-quarter 
target  values  for its aggregates.  In fact, it adopted  lower  target  values  for 
the monetary  aggregates.  Specifically,  the committee  adopted  target  values 
for the money  stock  of 2.0 percent  for the first  quarter  and 3.0 percent  for 
the second  quarter.  If a 3.0 percent  annual  rate  of increase  was  appropriate 
for the second  quarter,  why  not for the first  as well?  Realizing  a 3.0 percent 
annual  rate of increase  for the first  quarter  could not have required  "too 
large"  a  jump  in the  money  stock  in March,  except  in terms  of the resulting 
impact  of easing  money  market  conditions.  The decision  thus  can perhaps 
be read as indicating  that the committee  retained  its aversion  to sharp 
changes  in money  market  conditions. 
The  event  was  repeated  in early  May.  According  to the policy  record,  the 
money  stock increased  more in April than had been expected.12  So at its 
early  May  meeting,  the committee  faced  a choice  between  voting  for firmer 
money  market  conditions  and  adopting  a higher  value  for the money  stock 
target  in the second  quarter.  And again  it changed  its target  values.13 
At its March  meeting,  the committee  may have  judged  that the demand 
for money had decreased  (and would remain abnormally  low through 
March).  Such  a decision  would  explain  its lower  target  value  for the money 
stock.  And at its early  May  meeting,  the committee  may  have  decided  that 
the demand  for money  had increased  and  that a higher  target  value  for the 
second-quarter  money  stock  was therefore  appropriate.  But such  an inter- 
pretation  contrasts  with the switch in January  to greater  emphasis  on 
monetary  aggregates,  which  suggested  that the committee  had confidence 
in the stability  of the demand  for money. 
11. "Record  of Policy Actions,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletini,  Vol. 56 (June 1970),  p. 510. 
12. "Record  of Policy Actions," Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Vol. 56 (August 1970), p. 
630. 
13. With  a financial  crisis  threatening,  the committee  decided  at its early  May meeting 
to give priority  to the objective  of moderating  "pressures  in financial  markets."  Intro- 
ducing a money market  conditions constraint,  it need not, however,  have changed its 
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Target  and  Actual  Values 
I turn now to a comparison of actual and target values of the aggregates 
over the first three quarters of 1970. Target values for the second and third 
quarters are clear: for the second, annual rates of increase of 4 pefcent for 
the money stock and the index; and for the third, an annual rate of increase 
for the money stock of 5 percent. For the first quarter, I take the target 
values adopted by the committee on March  10, its last meeting of that 
period-annual  rates of increase of 2.0 percent for the money stock and 1.3 
percent for the index. 
Target and actual values are given in Table 2.14 In the first quarter, 
actual money growth (unrevised) was nearly double the committee's 2.0 
percent target, although the index deviation was not so large. In the second 
quarter,  the money stock was almost on target but the proxy, and hence the 
index, substantially  exceeded the targeted growth. In the third quarter, the 
money stock (the only aggregate target variable) was again practically on 
target. 
Table 2.  Federal Open Market Committee  Target Values and Actual 
Values, Three Quarters 1970 
Annual  rates  of change of averages  for last month of quarter  in percent 
Mon2ey  stock 
Adjusted banlk 
Actial  value  credit proxy  Index 
Target  Pre-  Re-  Target  Actual  Target  Actual 
Quarter  value  liminary  vised  value  value  value  value 
First  2.0  3.8  5.9  0.5  0.5  1.3  2.2 
Second  4.0  4.2  5.8  4.0  6.5  4.0  5.4 
Third  5.0  5.1  6.1  n.a.  17.2  n.a.  11.2 
Sources: Federal  Reserve  Bulletin, various issues, and advance release on revised money stock series from 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
n.a. Not available. 
14. In late November,  the Board of Governors  put out a revised  money stock time 
series  for the period  through  mid-November  1970. Rates of change  calculated  from the 
revised  series  and the unrevised  series  differ  considerably  from one another  (see Table 2). 
It seems, however, that the committee first became aware of a pending substantial 
revision  at its September  15 meeting,  so rates of change calculated  from the unrevised 
money stock series should be used in appraising  the realization of the committee's 
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During  the fourth  quarter,  through  the week ended  November  18, the 
money  stock apparently  increased  at an annual  rate  of only about  2.9 per- 
cent  even  though  the rates  on three-month  bills  and  federal  funds  decreased 
roughly  75 basis points. The explanation  for the slow growth of money 
could be the General  Motors  strike.  But if so, the committee  must  be put- 
ting  considerable  weight  on near-term  fluctuations  in money  market  condi- 
tions, and  thus allowing  the demand  for money  to influence  the growth  of 
the supply. 
Real GNP and  Interest  Rates  through  Mid-1972 
Projections  of real  GNP, the unemployment  rate,  the inflation  rate,  and 
interest  rates  for alternative  FOMC policies  are given  in Table 3. There 
are three  alternative  policies  representing  differing  growth  profiles  of the 
money  stock:  (1) a steady  increase  at a 5 percent  annual  rate  from  the fourth 
quarter  of 1970  on; (2) an increase  at a 5 percent  annual  rate  in the fourth 
quarter  of 1970  and  at a 6 percent  rate  thereafter;  (3) an increase  at a 5 per- 
cent rate  in the fourth  quarter  and at a 7 percent  rate  thereafter. 
The projections  allow, however,  for only one fiscal  policy: Federal  ex- 
penditures  total $215  billion  and  federal  purchases  are $99 billion  in fiscal 
1971;  expenditures  total $230 billion and purchases  $103 billion  in fiscal 
1972.15 
From  Table  3 it appears  that an extra 1 percentage  point in the annual 
rate  of growth  of the money  stock  makes  some difference,  but not a great 
deal. These  results  imply  that return  to an unemployment  rate of even 5 
percent  by mid-1972  could require  a money  stock increasing  at a 9 or 10 
percent  annual  rate, at least over the first  two or three  quarters  of 1971, 
and  perhaps  something  more  than 5 percent  thereafter.  Of course,  such a 
recovery  could also result  from a more expansionary  fiscal  policy or an 
increase,  which cannot now be foreseen,  in private  demand  for current 
output. 
How will the committee  respond?  It has been roundly  criticized  for 
tolerating  sharp  increases  in the money  stock  in 1967  and 1968.  Then,  too, 
the dollar  assets of foreign  central  banks  have already  increased  sharply 
and  could  increase  further,  depending  in part  on whether  the rate  of growth 
15. It was assumed  that the General  Motors strike  would end on November 15, and 
that there  would be neither  a steel strike  nor an anticipatory  inventory  buildup. FOMC Policy:  1970 and Beyond  483 
Table 3.  Projections  of Selected Economic  Indicators  for Alternative  FOMC 
Policies, FRB-MIT-Penn Model, 1970-72 
Percent 
Economic  indicator 
and FOMC  policy  1970:4  1971:1  1971:2  1971:3  1971:4  1972:1  1972:2 
Real gross national 
product  (annual  change) 
Firsta  -1.1  3.3  1.5  2.7  3.8  4.3  5.1 
Secondb  -1.1  3.4  1.8  3.4  4.7  5.3  6.0 
Thirdo  -1.1  3.5  2.2  4.1  5.6  6.3  7.1 
Unemployment  rate 
First  5.9  5.9  5.9  6.2  6.4  6.5  6.5 
Second  5.9  5.9  5.9  6.1  6.2  6.2  6.1 
Third  5.9  5.9  5.9  6.0  6.0  5.9  5.7 
GNP deflator  (annual  chanige) 
First  4.4  4.2  3.2  3.5  3.0  2.6  1.9 
Second  4.4  4.2  3.2  3.5  3.1  2.6  2.0 
Third  4.4  4.2  3.3  3.5  3.1  2.7  2.1 
Interest  rates 
Treasury  bills 
Ilirst  5.9  6.1  6.1  6.1  6.3  6.4  6.5 
Second  5.9  5.9  5.9  5.9  6.0  6.1  6.2 
Third  5.9  5.7  5.6  5.7  5.7  5.8  6.0 
Corporate  bondsd 
First  7.9  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.1  8.2  8.2 
Second  7.9  7.9  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.1  8.2 
Third  7.9  7.9  7.9  8.0  8.0  8.1  8.1 
Source: Regression results, FRB-MIT-Penn model. 
a.  Money stock is increased at 5 percent annual rate 1970:4-1972:2. 
b.  Money stock is increased at annual rate of 5 percent in 1970:4 and 6 percent thereafter. 
c.  Money stock is increased at annual rate of 5 percent in 1970:4 and 7 percent thereafter. 
d.  Moody's index of Aaa corporate bonds. 
of the European  economy  continues  to slacken.  If not, a difficult  choice 
may lie ahead,  since  a much  more  expansionary  monetary  policy,  possibly 
required  for  reducing  the unemployment  rate,  could  result  in a considerable 
increase  in dollar  assets  of foreign  central  banks  and  threaten  the future  of 
special  drawing  rights. 
To be sure,  the interest  rate  projections  of Table  3 may be reassuring  on 
the issue  of international  flows.  They  imply  that  interest  rates  are  not going 
to change  much  no matter  what  the committee  does. But with  the bill rate 
already  below  5.0 percent,  it is not clear  that  these  projections  are  credible. 484  John  H. Kareken 
Discussion 
SEVERAL  PARTICIPANTS  COMMENTED  on  the very slow  growth of  the 
money  stock in October and November,  especially in terms of  what it 
revealed about the key issue of Kareken's report-the  Federal Reserve's 
relative emphasis on quantities and on market conditions. 
William Poole thought short-run variations in the growth rates of money 
might be consistent with a policy aiming at a target path but permitting 
temporary aberrations from that path in order to  reduce the swings in 
market interest rates. Perhaps the  key policy  variable is  a path  of  the 
money stock rather than the rate of growth of money month by month. 
Franco Modigliani felt that the behavior of the money supply in the fourth 
quarter was not independent of the General Motors strike. Since transac- 
tions were  reduced  because of the strike, a given change in the money supply 
would lead to a greater  decline in interest rates. Slower growth of money in 
the fourth quarter could be justified on those grounds. But the same rea- 
soning would call for a more rapid expansion of money in the first quarter, 
when transactions should pick up. David Fand noted that total reserves 
and the monetary base had been growing at a substantial rate. These indi- 
cators suggest  that the Federal Reserve has been more actively expansionary 
than the money growth rates would imply. James Tobin was concerned that 
the monetary strategy might produce "the worst of  both worlds": The 
commitment to  a monetary growth target may hold when otherwise the 
rate of growth would exceed the target; but the target rate of growth may 
not be realized when interest rates would fall drastically  if that much money 
were provided. Tobin warned: "It could turn out to be an asymmetrical 
policy. If interest rates are declining, the Fed does not push ahead with 
5 percent monetary growth. But it does not raise the 5 percent target when 
that policy causes rates to rise." 
Daniel Brill questioned whether policy in 1970, operating under money 
and bank credit targets, has really been substantially different from what 
it would have been under the 1966-69 type of directive that incorporated 
money market targets and a bank credit proviso. John Kareken thought 
that Federal Reserve behavior had been somewhat different in 1970. David 
Fand reminded the panel that the Federal Reserve had permitted a con- 
traction in money during previous recessions, even though its stance had 
been expansionary  in terms of interest rates, free reserves, and market con- 
ditions. Although 1970 is not completely analogous to these earlier  periods, 
it offers some evidence of progress, he suggested. 